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economy as a result of the migratory process. The paper 
describes peasant attitudes towards migration as a portfolio 
decision making process, where peasants allocate labor to the 
coca fields or the urban sector according to relative earnings 
and risk structure. The empirical estimation, using data on 
wages and risk factors (i.e. political violence) for the coca 
region and Lima, shows that migration to the coca sector is an 
economically rational decision. using log-linear and non-linear 
specifications, it is shown that wage differentials and political 
violence in the coca region and the urban sector are significant 
in affecting migration to the coca sector. Unemployment in the 
urban sector shows an inconclusive effect. The variables used, 
although they seem to have non-stationary properties, are 
cointegrated and therefore validate standard inference 
procedures. A simple test of stability of the parameters shows 
that they do not change significantly through time. 
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1. Introduction 
Anti-drug policy of the U.S. government has placed great 
emphasis on attacking production sources. The aim has been to 
reduce production directly by eradication and indirectly by 
denying inputs to coca production. These policies are not 
without controversy. In the emotion-laden debate it is difficult 
to consider alternatives analytically. This paper attempts to 
analyze empirically the factors determining labor migration to 
the coca region. It studies the factors determining migration 
patterns of the peasantry from the Andean region to the coca 
fields in the jungle areas of Peru, especially to the Upper 
Huallaga Valley. 
The paper will use the limited data on labor supply in the 
coca region, wage differentials between the coca sector and the 
urban sector, and proxies for risk, and it tests the implications 
of a portfolio decision model with the aim of explaining the 
determinants of migration to the coca fields from the 1970s on. 
Labor migration in less developed countries have been an 
important topic for both theoretical and empirical analysis in 
economic development. The traditional approach to explain 
migration has been the expected income hypothesis, which analyzes 
migration as a consequence of the expected income of the 
alternative destinations compared to the original location, 
considering the probability of not getting a job. Risk as an 
important element in the decision to migrate has been a recent 
addition to the migration literature in economics. In 
anthropological studies, nevertheless, the concept of risk has 
been used fairly extensively since the 1970s to explain peasant 
choice of alternative crops and behavior toward other 
opportunities of economic diversification. 
It would be easy to predict that, given the condition of the 
Peruvian economy, migration to the coca fields should be 
immediate and massive, causing unlimited availability of labor. 
Yet this has not happened. This apparent paradox may be 
explained by the high risk in the area, not only because coca is 
an illegal economic activity but also because of political 
--------------_._-_. 
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violence. Labor is thus inhibited from migrating. One of the 
main ideas of this paper is that migration is not only a function 
of expected income differentials, or of the perception of income 
variability in one region, but also of the income variability in 
all sectors of the economy. Just as investors diversify their 
assets to minimize risk, so do peasants and migrants in general. 
They diversify their different economic activities so as to 
manage the inherent risk to their livelihoods. 
The peasantry finds an optimal allocation of labor, and 
therefore of migration, based not only on income differentials 
but also on the variability of income. This empirical exercise 
looks at variables of income differentials and perceptions of 
risk through indicators of political violence. The results show 
that both income differentials and risk factors such as violence 
are important in determining the supply of labor to the coca 
region. 
The description of the economics of coca production and 
trade are well beyond the scope of this paper. We should know, 
however, that the production and trade of coca, coca paste, and 
cocaine, as a result of growing world demand, has had a 
signif icant impact in the Peruvian economy as a whole. Coca 
paste and cocaine base are not only the main Peruvian export, but 
also the most important agricultural commodity in terms of 
employment generation. l 
2. Migration and Risk Aversion in the Andes 
Income derived from off-farm activities is significant for 
almost every peasant group in Latin America. According to 
Collins (1987), an examination of empirical studies on labor 
scarcity and income obtained from off-farm work for the peasant 
population of Latin America shows that on average, more than 50 
percent of income generated by peasants came from off-farm 
1 For a detailed account of the coca economy, see Morales 
(1989}, Alvarez (1991), Bricefto and Martinez (1989), and Revilla 
(i992) . 
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employment; income from wages was 30 percent or more. These 
percentages were usually higher for families with smaller plots 
of land. 
Ability to earn wages from off-farm work are not the only 
reason why peasants leave the land. Peasants take part in many 
other economic activities such as commerce, artisanry, and 
remittances, which provide alternative incomes for subsistance. 
Deere and de Janvry (1979) found that northern Peruvian peasants 
obtained almost half of their total income from wages while only 
a quarter of it was provided by agriculture and animal 
husbandry.2 According to Collins: 
"This diversification of activities represents an attempt 
on the part of rural families to increase levels of income 
absolutely, as well as to accommodate the risk inherent in 
individual activities." 3 
From the empirical estimates available in relation to income 
diversification for small farm households in Latin America, we 
can establish that of all the alternative incomes migration for 
wages (in manufacturing or even in other agricultural activities) 
is the most important way of off farm income for the rural 
family, sometimes, as in the southern Andes of Peru, labor income 
is greater than farm income. Migration is both a seasonal 
phenomena in response. to different labor requirements in 
agriculture, as well as a permanent decision based on leaving the 
farm in order to look for a higher expected income and to 
decrease total risk. Seasonal migration has been usually 
considered as the only kind of migration that peasants will make 
in order to decrease uncertainty. However, when the decision 
making agent is the family, even the permanent migration of a 
family member is part of the risk aversive strategy, due to the 
fact that remittances are used. 4 
2 Deere and de Janvry (1979), p. 607. 
3 Collins (1987), p. 21. 
4 The issue of remittances has been empirically studied by 
Lucas (1985) in Botswana. 
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The decision of the peasant family to diversify income is 
influenced by many different factors. Land (and paradoxically 
l~bor) scarcity is one of the reasons for migration. Although 
they seem contradictory, they do occur at the same time. One of 
the consequences of land scarcity is a reduction of household 
income. This reduction forces some of the productive members of 
the household into other activities, and sometimes even to leave 
the rural areas permanently. The decline in the prices of rural 
goods (or decline in the rural-urban terms of trade) is another 
reason why diversification occurs via production of other 
products or migration. 5 
Different diversification strategies are, of course, limited 
by the availability of resources of the peasant household. The 
economic activities in which the households would allocate labor 
require different levels of labor and skills. Children, adults, 
women or the elderly, would have different abilities and 
strengths to use in various activities. 
Studies on the peasant population of the central and 
southern highlands of Peru show a good example of seasonal 
migration. The peasants on the northern shore of Lake Titicaca 
cultivate high-altitude crops, while at the same time nearly a 
third of the same population grows coffee on the slopes of the 
Andes. There is also seasonal migration to the coast for wages 
as well as migration for commerce and wage labor on the 
highlands. The peasant population of these highlands (the Aymara 
indians) represent a very good example of the diversification of 
economic activi ties, not only on their own land through crop 
diversification, but also through seasonal migration, which has 
utilized the available labor resources to the limit. 6 
By looking at the value of subsistence production, Painter 
(1986), examines the pattern of migration and other economic 
activities of a peasant region in Puno. He estimates first the 
market value of an hour of labor in subsistence agriculture, and 
then those of the other income generating activities. With the 
5 Collins (1987) , p. 22. 
6 Collins (1987) , p. 27. 
5 
empirical data available it is feasible to test a hypothesis of 
risk aversion and utility maximization. 7 C" 
3. Risk and Uncertainty in Peruvian Agriculture 
r .". 
The concepts of risk and uncertainty applied to the Peruvianl.o 
r.
 
Andes are explained by Guillet (1981). He argues that the
 
maximization of output is constrained not only by the inputs and
 
prices but also by the level of information pertaining to
 
possible outcomes. He uses the concept of risk management to
 
explain how the peasantry use different production strategies to
 
minimize risk and uncertainty. The same way that investors
 
"" diversify their assets to minimize risk, peasants diversify their
 
different economic activities to manage the inherent risk to
 
their livelihoods. The most common method of diversifying risk
 
in the highlands is through the use of mixed subsistence 
strategies, consisting in the use of a mixed agro-pastoral 
production. In the high altitude regions in the Andes, for 
instance, agricultural production of potatoes and other tubers 
is combined with keeping small animals, such as guinea pigs. 
Another strategy of spreading risk is diversification of staples, 
which can be done horizontally or vertically. The first 
strategy, is called horizontal because it is done at the same 
altitude, through the production of mixed staples (i.e. 
potatotoes and maize) and the latter is called vertical because 
it is done by planting crops of different varieties of crops, at 
different altitudes. 8 The combination of these two products with 
other products such as protein rich quinhoa, tarwi and cafiihua [~." is also used as a way of diversifying risk to obtain a minimum 
[." 
7 See Painter (1986). 
8 The use of hundreds of different varieties of potatoes as 
a way of responding to the changing weather is a clear example 
of diversifying risk in a horizontal space diversification. 
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of production for sUbsistence. 9 A third way in which the 
peasantry diversifies to minimize risk is through their 
interaction with different sectors of the economy. The most 
common among these alternatives is the use of labor migration for 
wages in the coastal cities, in the highlands, and colonization 
or migration for wages in the jungle. Migration, nevertheless, 
is not the only way to diversify through the different economic 
sectors; there are other ways that include commerce, artisanry, 
sale of dairy products and many other small activities. 
In the southern Peruvian Andes, the case of one peasant 
community and its attitudes regarding risk management is 
presented by Guillet (1981). He shows that not only are peasants 
risk averse, but that there is also a large tradition of risk 
avoidance, and that the peasant family will evaluate any possible 
alternative so as to get the maximum amount of information 
available upon which to base a decision. This applies not only 
to innovative risks (such as the introduction of a new cash crop) 
but also to situations of uncertainty such as market prices and 
costs of inputs. 
4. Some Theoretical Perspectives on Migration 
Migration as a result of a rational decision by poor 
peasants in less developed countries has been an important topic 
for both theoretical and empirical analysis in development 
economics. Most of the literature is concentrated around the 
topic of rural-urban migration and the implications of that 
process for rural development, as well as the impact on the urban 
areas and the economic development of the country. Inter­
regional migration for less developed countries has been less 
studied than the case for developed countries, but it has usually 
been linked to the rural-urban dilemma. 
9 It is precisely this complexity of production strategies 
in order to diversify risk that gives rise to the extreme 
parcelling of peasant lands found in the Andes. 
i 
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One way of including the effects of risk on migration is 
suggested by the Expected Income Hypothesis (EIH) of Todaro 
(1969) and Harris and Todaro (1970), which considers that if we 
utilize an intertemporal utility function, we can incorporate not 
only income but risk (or income variability). It seems fair to 
assume that risk in the urban sector will decrease with time, 
when opportunities of work would be easy to find as a network of 
contacts is developed, to a point of being lower than the risk 
faced in the rural sector. Rural to urban migration will occur 
if a person is willing to exchange lower risk for higher risk 
now, but lower risk later. Katz and stark (1986) dismiss this 
explanation because it imposes narrow bounds on the time discount 
factor. 
In Stark and Lehvari (1982), it is presented that the EIH 
does not include risk or risk aversion in its modelling. When 
faced with the fact that some migration could occur with lower 
expected income in the urban areas, the EIH answers with an 
intertemporal utility function such that future urban expected 
income is going to be high so as to compensate for initial lower 
expected income. All of this does not include risk or 
variability. They sustain that expected income is a positive 
factor for migration, while risk is negative (i. e. migrants 
derive utility from income, and disutility from risk). If 
expected incomes are equal in the rural and the urban sector, and 
even with high risk in the urban sector, migration can occur so 
as to minimize risk. It is no longer a process of expected 
income maximization but one of risk aversion. 
Stark and Lehvari (1982) therefore suggest that by 
perfecting or creating a rural insurance market, migration from 
the rural to the urban sector could decrease. This is the case 
in the production of coca, which, as an illegal activity presents 
a high risk, but is ironically less risky than the production of 
other crops, as credit is more readily available to the farmer, 
because the drug traffickers make credit readily available to the 
coca growers, and reducing the uncertainty of the final crop. 
It can be seen, then, how the process of migration of peasants 
L 
8 
r 
t 
( . 
( 
to the urban sector and the coca region is more a result of risk 
aversion than of risk loving. 
There is a growing tendency in the economic literature to 
shift the focus of attention from the individual to the family 
as the most relevant economic agent. References to this can be 
found at the theoretical level in Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), 
and empirically in migration and remittance issues by Lucas and 
Stark (1985). According to this approach then, migration by the 
individual will then diversify the income of the family and will, 
by that reason, diminish the overall risk. 
Katz and Stark (1986) offer th~ following alternative for 
a model that includes the family as the unit of analysis: 1) The 
head of the family is the only authority. And, 2) a cooperative 
arrangement between the family and the migrant is established for 
a number of purposes: Tipically these are to trade in risks and 
establish co insurance arrangements. Devices must also be set to 
handle principal agent and moral hazard problems. For example, 
the migrant sometimes may understate his success in the urban 
areas, or increase his standard of living in order to increase 
his surplus. If there is migration by 20r more family members, 
problems of coalition formation may arise. 
Models of migration using the portfolio analysis have been 
suggested by Stark and Bloom (1985) and Stark (1991). A simple 
model developed in order to explain the process of labor supply 
allocation, from the perspective of a utility maximizing and risk 
averse peasant family, is presented in Revilla (1992). The 
migration process takes place from the rural (agr icultural) 
sector to the urban (industrial) sector and to the coca sector. 
The decision making unit is the family and not the individual 
because the peasant family is the unit of production in 
agriculture. It is also the family that makes the decisions as 
to what to produce or where individual members must go. These 
decisions are made in the interest of increasing the earnings of 
the whole family or diminishing the risk associated with only one 
economic activity such as agriculture. In this model, it is 
explained how a utility maximizing family with a risk averse 
utili ty function will decide on migration patterns, by allocating 
9 
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family members to different sectors. Considered here will be 
expected earning differentials, as well as the risk structure of 
e~ch particular sector. 
5. Empirical Testing of Labor Migration to the Coca Region 
According to a very general portfolio specification, 
migration to the coca region will be analyzed not only as a 
function of income differentials, but also as a function of the 
general perception of risk attached to the alternative regions 
targeted for migration. 10 
A portfolio approach suggest that there are two sets of 
variables: expected earnings (Z;), and variances of the earnings 
(0;2) in the two sectors of the economy. In general we can define 
the allocation of labor destined to the coca sector, with the 
following non-functional form: 
r 
\ for i = 1,2 
L' 
From this reduced form equation, it should be expected that 
the effect of the changes on incomes and risks on labor allocated 
to the coca region (the signs of the partial derivatives) will 
be as follows: aL/aZ I > 0, aL/aZ 2 < 0, (and aL/a(ZI - Z2) > 0) on 
the expected income side, and aL/ao l < 0, and aL/a02 > 0, on the 
risk side. 
We will use an aggregate measure: the total labor allocated 
to the coca sector in the Upper Huallaga Valley (where most of 
the Peruvian coca is grown and most of the coca paste is 
manufactured). This variable is derived from estimates of the 
amount of land assigned to coca cultivation in the Upper Huallaga 
10 For a more detailed presentation of a simple portfolio 
model of migration, see Revilla (1992). Portfolio models were 
originally developed by Tobin (1958), Sharpe (1964), and Merton 
(1973). An empirical test is suggested by Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) . 
10 
Valley. A quarterly time series from 1980 to 1990 is then 
r generated. For an explanation of the assumptions used, thel 
sources, and the series, see Appendices 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows 
the evolution of labor supply in the coca fields. 
c' FIGURE 1 
On the right hand side of the equation to be estimated, the 
first variable to be considered is expected labor earnings 
differentials. The variable to be used is the difference between 
the average wage income in the Upper Huallaga Valley and the 
minimum wage in Lima. 11 These wages are measured at constant 
prices of 1979 in thousands of Intis. For a more detailed 
description of these two series, see Appendices 1 and 2. Figure 
2 shows the difference between the daily wage in the coca region 
and the minimum wage in Lima. 
r 
\ FIGURE 2 
The second set of variables on the right hand side of the 
equation to be estimated is related to risk measurement. Given 
that we do not have measures for the distribution of earnings on 
a quarterly basis, we must rely on alternative or proxy measures 
of risk to observe the variances of expected income. 12 To obtain 
11 In the calculation of wages for the Upper Huallaga valley, 
when meals has been used as partial payment, its approximate 
value has been included. 
12 It should be noted that the variance is not always the 
best measurement of risk. This can be shown for many utility 
functions in which a reduction in variance, keeping the expected 
income constant, does not necessarily correspond to an increase 
in expected utility, therefore, making the variance not a good 
indicator for risk. However, if the utility function is 
quadratic, or the distribution function of income is fully 
described by its mean and variance, the variance is still 
------------------------------
11 
proxies for the true measure of risk, probably the most difficult 
variable to observe, we consider two different variables. The 
first is unemployment in the urban sector. This variable has 
been traditionally used as a risk variable in migration models. 
The variable used is the inverse of the one represented in Figure 
3 as the index of employment in Lima's petty trader sector. 
FIGURE 3 
The second variable is an index of violent acts (mostly 
political) in the different regions. We believe that violence, 
given the current political situation in Peru, is a good proxy 
for risk and uncertainty in the economy as a whole, as well as 
( in the two specific sectors: Lima and the coca sector in the 
\ .. 
Upper Huallaga Valley. 13 
Figures 4 and 5 show the number of violent acts in the coca 
region and in the province of Lima for each quarter since 1980. 
FIGURES 4 AND 5 
5.1. Estimation with Risk in the Urban Sector 
Our objective in this section is to look at the effect of 
income differentials, violence in the urban sector, and 
unemployment in the urban sector with respect to labor allocated 
to the coca sector. Given the previous data, the equation that 
we will test is the following: 
1', 
monotonically decreasing in utility. See Newbery and stiglitz 
(1981), pp. 76-77. 
13 The numbers used for both variables and how were they 
obtained is discussed in the Appendices 3 and 4. 
l 
12 
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Where: 
LCOt is the dependent variable and is equal to the natural 
logarithm of the total labor supply allocated to the coca sector 
in the period t. 
C is the intercept. 
LWDt is the natural logarithm of the differential of wages 
paid to coca peasants in the Upper Huallaga Valley and the 
minimum wage paid to unskilled workers in the urban sector. 
LV~ is a proxy for risk in the urban sector, and the level 
of political violence is equal to the natural logarithm of the 
number of violent acts in the Province of Lima. 
LUNt is the natural logarithm of the inverse of the 
employment index for the petty trader sector in Lima. 
~l is a randomly distributed random error. 
When we run the regressions under OLS, we assume two 
patterns of behavior. The first regression takes the data "as 
is", that is, as the original data with no correction for 
seasonality. The second regression includes dummy variables to 
control for seasonality of the series. The results are shown in 
the first two columns of table 1. 
We found no significant differences between the estimates 
of the two specifications of the model (with and without dummies 
for seasonality), although the presence of seasonality seems 
significant and produces a slightly better fit. In both cases, 
wi th almost the same estimates, wage differentials and risk 
factors such as violence and unemployment prove to be 
statistically significantly different from o. The signs are 
positive as expected, with a greater elasticity of 3.1 for 
unemployment in the urban sector, 0.65 for the wage differential, 
and 0.25 for violence in the urban sector. 
Due to the low Durbin-Watson statistics, we can see a 
problem of positive first order serial correlation of the 
residuals. This is further pointed out by the Box-pierce Q-
13 
statistic. 14 The high values of the Box-Pierce Q-statistic for 
the specifications in the first two columns of the table 1 make 
us reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of the 
residuals. 
There are several reasons why the error terms are 
autocorrelated. The first is that the model is not completely 
specified, that is, some explanatory variables are not included. 
This can be especially true given the general difficulty of 
measuring risk as an economic variable, particularly in the case 
of the coca economy. The second reason can be a misspecification 
of the equation to be tested. This is relevant to our case 
because our reduced equation model is very general. Even if we 
were testing the original formulation of the portfolio 
relationship, assuming an explicit risk averse utility function, 
we should test the validity of such a function. The third source 
for serial correlation of the errors is the possibility of a 
measurement error in the dependent variable. This can also be 
relevant to our case. In fact, our model may suffer from each 
of these problems. 
There are different techniques to correct for serial 
correlation of residuals. By looking at the autocorrelation and 
partial autocorrelation tables of the Box-Jenkins identification 
procedure, we find that a Moving Average (MA) process can best 
explain the serial correlation of the residuals. This procedure 
shows the values of total and partial autocorrelation of the 
residual, and allows us to see the specific autoregressive or 
moving average specification to be tested for the residuals. 
In order to correct the problems of serial correlation of 
residuals, we use a generalized least squares estimation 
procedure, including the moving averages of the residuals. This 
r
~ The Box-pierce Q statistic is a test for the different 
autocorrelations of the residuals, for a number of lags (M). If 
all the autocorrelations are zero, then the error term of the
'-
model is called "white noise". This statistic is distributed as 
a chi-square with degrees of freedom equal to M minus the number 
of parameters of the model. In all the tables presented in this 
paper, the Box-Pierce Q statistic uses 20 as the number of lags 
to measure (i.e. M = 20). 
14 
procedure is asymptotically equivalent to a maximum likelihood 
estimation. 
In this case, we will again include one estimation with the 
dummies for seasonality and one without. The results of both 
estimations are shown in the third and fourth columns of table 
1. 
The results are not significantly different from those of 
the OLS estimation, all coefficients are significantly different 
from zero, and they do not show a problem of serial correlation 
in the residuals. This is shown both in the Durbin Watson close 
to 2 and a Box-Pierce Q-statistic of 9.47 and 8.76, for the non-
seasonal and for seasonally adjusted data, respectively. This 
means we should not reject the null-hypothesis of non serial 
correlation of the residuals with a probability of 0.98 and 0.99, 
respectively. 
The use of MA(l), MA(2), MA(3) and MA(4) is consistent with 
the fact that the dependent variable is explained by a fourth 
order moving average process. This in turn can be explained by 
the seasonality of the series. 15 The results of this estimation 
for most of the variables are very similar with those in which 
we do not include dummies for seasonality. 
TABLE 1 
All of these results seem to be consistent with the 
assumptions of a positive relationship between labor supply 
allocation on the one hand, and both wage differentials between 
the coca and the urban sector, and risk variables in the urban 
sector, on the other. No significant difference comes from the 
15 This is equivalent to a moving average process of 4th 
order. A moving average process of nth order, includes the (n-
l)th previous moving averages. But in the estimation process 
used, an nth moving average (MA(n)) only includes the nth moving 
average. This allows more flexibility in order to choose a more 
precise specification in case an intermediate moving average is 
not relevant. 
15 
r : 
Le 
f : 
L\ 
use of dummies for the seasonal components in terms of the 
estimators or their significance. 
It may seem that these estimates are robust, but the fact 
that in the urban sector unemployment and violence have been 
growing, while real wages have been falling can also be a 
explained by a major change in the Peruvian economy. In order 
to control for these effects, a time trend is used as a proxy for 
other factors that can influence the growth of the coca sector. 
For most of the 1980s, the Peruvian economy was stagnant. This 
stagnation can help explain the growth of the coca economy. By 
using a time trend, we are not only trying to understand how much 
of the dependent variable is explained by the trend, but also how 
much is explained by variables that are independent of the trend. 
Thus in table 2, we test the same specifications as before, but 
add a time trend as an explanatory variable. 
TABLE 2 
When we include the time trend in this specification of the 
regression, the variables behave similarly, with the exception 
of unemployment. This loses statistical significance, or even 
becomes negative, suggesting that the estimate for unemployment 
is not a robust estimator. The values of the elasticities 
estimated for wage differential and violence in the urban sector 
remain with a positive sign (although the parameters are smaller 
by one half as compared to those of table 1), and are still 
statistically significant. The time trend seems to be 
statistically significant, but a parameter of 0.05 implies that 
a change in the time trend only affects the labor supply to the 
coca sector with a 5 percent change. 
One of the measurements of risk in the urban sector, the 
variable of unemployment, can also be an endogenous variable, 
even though it has been included as exogenous. This is because 
we specify that unemployment in the urban sector affects the 
labor supply to the coca sector, but it is also likely that labor 
I
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supply to the coca sector affects unemployment in the urban 
sector. In order to solve for this simultaneous equation 
problem, we use a 2SLS procedure, in which we use the index of 
industrial production in Lima as an instrument for unemployment 
in the urban petty trader sector in Lima. This is done because 
industrial production in Lima is correlated with employment in 
Lima, but not with employment in the coca sector. Figure 6 shows 
the evolution of the Peruvian industrial output from 1980 to 
1990. 
FIGURE 6 
The results of the different 2SLS estimations are presented 
in table 3. The first column is a 2SLS estimation where no 
seasonality correction is used. The second column includes 
seasonal dummies for the same estimation. The third column has 
no seasonality correction but corrects for serial correlation of 
the residuals with a fourth order moving average process. 
Finally, the fourth column includes the moving average 
representation of a fourth order, as well as the dummies for 
seasonality. Table 4 presents a similar estimation, but it 
includes a time trend. 
TABLES 3 AND 4 
The results of the two 2SLS estimations are similar to those 
of the previous estimations. Again, the generalized least 
squares estimation considering the moving average process solves 
for serial correlation of the residuals. In table 3, the Box-
Pierce Q-Statistic for the third and fourth columns (without and 
with seasonal dummies) supports the null hypothesis of non-serial 
correlation of the errors with probability of 0.99 in both cases. 
Including the trend, in table 4, a first and fourth order moving 
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average process for the non-seasonally adjusted regression do not 
reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of the 
errors. The inclusion of the seasonal dummies and a complete 
fourth order moving average process changes the probability of 
no serial correlation of the errors to 0.99. 
In both cases (with and without a time trend) the estimates 
of the parameters for wage differentials and violence in the 
urban sector are positive and statistically significant. The 
estimates for the parameter on urban . unemployment is not 
statistically significant. 
The different estimations of this model of labor supply 
allocation to the coca sector tend to show that income 
differentials are important in affecting the size of labor supply 
to the coca sector, with an elasticity of approximately 0.6, or 
0.3 if we include a time trend. The level of political violence 
in the urban sector (represented by the province of Lima) is also 
significant, with elasticities of approximately 0.2 and 0.1 
respectively. Finally, the risk of being unemployed in the urban 
sector seems to play an inconclusive role, given that the high 
elasticity (greater than 3) shown in the first estimations loses 
statistical significance if we introduce a time trend. The 2SLS 
estimation (even with no time trend) shows a relatively low 
statistical power for urban unemployment. 
In order to look at a more complete specification of the 
risk variables for both urban and coca sectors, we next use 
indicators of polit'ical violence simultaneously for both sectors. 
5.2. Estimation of a Log-Linear Model with Income and Risk 
in Both Sectors 
Here we present see a different specification of the model, 
where instead of concentrating on the urban sector as the only 
source of risk, we will test a more complete model where both 
sectors have an expected income and a variable that indicates 
risk. The risk variables will be represented by political 
violence in Lima and in the Upper Huallaga Valley. 
18 
In this estimation, we test the model as presented in 
equation (1), assuming as in the previous sub-section a log-
linear specification of the variables. 
Where LeO, LWD and LVL are defined as before, and 
LVC is the proxy for risk in the coca sector (represented 
by the level of political violence in the coca region, the Upper 
I 
I Huallaga Valley), and is equal to the natural logarithm of the 
I 
:l number of violent acts in the Departments of Huanuco and San Martin. 
The results of the estimation, using OLS and the correction 
for serial correlation of the errors by a moving average 
specification, is presented in table 5. As in the first model 
L~	 estimated, we present the estimations with and without the 
inclusion of dummies for seasonality, in the first and second 
columns. The third and fourth columns use a fourth order moving 
average of the residuals to estimate the parameters, in order to 
I 
I -, solve for serial correlation of the residuals.
:l 
TABLE 5 
:[
I Looking at these estimates, we see that the estimate of the 
elasticity for wage differential is close to 0.5 and is 
statistically significant. That is, an increase of 10 percent 
in wage differentials increases the labor allocated to the coca 
sector by 5 percent. The estimates for the elasticities of risk 
(i.e. political violence) are 0.16 and 0.21 for the coca region 
and the urban sector respectively. The value for the urban 
sector is positive as predicted by the model, but the elasticity 
r of violence in the coca region should have had the opposite sign.l 
In order to see how much of this effect can be attributed 
to a general trend in the Peruvian economy, we examine the effect 
of introducing a trend factor on labor allocation to the coca 
I 
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region. A trend variable is useful because most of the changes 
in the Peruvian economy are related to the general stagnation of 
the 1980s. At the same time that migration to the coca economy 
was constantly growing during the 1980s, political violence was 
growing in the urban sector as well as in the coca region (and 
the rural sector in general). Labor allocation to the coca 
region can be explained by this general trend because, among 
other reasons, wages in the urban sector eroded as unemployment 
grew. Political violence can be interpreted as one more sign of 
the general stagnation of the economy. 
In table 6, we run regressions with the same specifications 
as those of table 5, but now using a time trend variable. 
TABLE 6 
Table 6 shows that the time trend is statistically 
signif icant. 16 As before, the estimate of the elasticity 
parameter for the wage differential is statistically significant 
and positive. Regarding the risk variables, violence in the coca 
region now shows a negative value of -0.06 and is also 
significant. This is because the trend is no longer an element 
in the formation of this and other right hand side variables but 
is considered by itself. The parameter for violence in the urban 
sector is still significant, but now is equal to 0.10. 
One of the main assumptions used to justify the use of a 
time trend is that the Peruvian economy was either stagnant or 
contracting during most of the 1980s. As we can see from table 
7, there are at least two years in which this was not true, in 
1986 and 1987. This was mostly due to the heterodox economic 
pOlicy of the Alan Garcia administration, during which aggregate 
16 A null coefficient test on the third and fourth 
regressions of table 6 in comparison to those of table 5, gives 
very high values of a Chi square, with the probability of that 
estimate being null extremely close to o. We can then say that 
the time trend seems to be a significant variable in this 
estimation. 
.._---_..._--------------_.
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demand increased significantly. In order to allow for this we [ will include a dummy for these two years of high growth. The 
results are shown in table 8. 
TABLES 7 AND 8 
r 
with the inclusion of the dummy variable for the two years 
of the heterodox experience, the results are consistent with 
those found in the previous estimations, and even more 
significant. Not only is this dummy variable statistically 
significant, but the inclusion of this dummy generates a "better 
fit" estimation. This is shown by the higher t statistics for 
most of the variables. 
In general, this log linear specification is a more complete 
specification of the model than the previous one, and seems to 
be more adequate to explain the allocation of labor to the coca 
sector as a function of income differentials and specific risks. 
It has, however, the problem of being restrictive in the 
parameters. By assuming a log linear specif ication, we are 
imposing a set of restrictions that our original model, developed 
in section Five, did not have. In order to see if this model can 
be improved by looking at the interaction between the different\
L' variables, we will allow for a different specification. 
5.3. Estimation of a Translog specification 
A more general specification for the model is given by a 
translog function of the natural logarithm of the labor supply 
allocated to the coca sector (LeO). The translog function 
imposes the least amount of restrictions on the relations between 
fJ 
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the variables, and is considered to be the a good approximation 
of an arbitrary function. 17 
In the case of labor allocated to the coca sector as a 
function of income differentials and risk variables in both 
sectors, the translog function is given by: 
3 3 3 
LCO = L Bj In Xi + 1/2 LLB.I J In x I In x J ( 4 ) 
i=l i=l j =1 
f 
\ .. Where In XI is the natural logarithm of the wage 
differential (LWD), X2 is the natural logarithm of risk in the 
coca sector, or the number of violent acts (LVC), and x3 is the 
natural logarithm of the equivalent variable for the urban sector[: (LVL) . 
When i=j, we get the squares of the logarithms of the 
original functions. The equation to be estimated is the 
following: 
I 
\ LC01 = C + 13 1 LWD1 + 132 LVL1 + 133 LVC1 + 131.1 (LWD) 2[ 
+ 132,2 (LVL) 21 + 133,3 (LVC) 21 + 131.2 (LWD) (LVL) I 
+ 131,3 (LWD) (LVC)1 + 132,3 (LVL) (LVC)1 + f..Ll (5) 
By using a translog specification, we are not only allowing 
for a more unrestricted version of the model, but we can also see 
the different relationships between the variables included in the 
model. The results of different estimations of equation (5) are 
shown in table 9. 
TABLE 9 
U The translog function (defined usually for a cost 
function), is a good second order Taylor approximation of an 
arbitrary cost function. 
[ 
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As in the other specif ications of the model, the OLS 
estimations seem to have serial correlation of the errors, and 
we use the Box-Jenkins identification procedure to find the best 
specification to correct for autocorrelation. In this case, a 
second order moving average process seems to be the best 
procedure, as seen by the low values of the Box-Pierce statistic. 
The estimates of the coefficients for the translog 
specification, when corrected for autocorrelation of the errors 
and with no seasonal adjustment, are similar to those with 
dummies for seasonality, but also show higher statistical 
significance. Furthermore, seasonality does not seem significant 
according to the values for the t statistics. Our comments will 
therefore be based on the GLS estimates presented in the third 
column of table 9. The estimated coeff icients found in the 
following equation: 
LCOt = 10.75 + 2.00 LWDt + 0.68 LVLI - 1.02 LVCt 
+ 0.43 (LWD)~ - 0.08 (LVL)~ + 0.17 (LVC)~ 
I' 
- O. 77 (LWD) (LVC) I ( 6 ) 
l. 
Now the elasticities are not constant, as in the log linear 
case, but are functions that can change when other variables 
change. Each elasticity represented below measures the relative 
( 
change in labor allocated to the coca sector (LCO) , when therel 
is a relative change in any three of the variables (LWD, LVC, 
LVL) . 
The elasticities shown in the functions below (using the 
[' partial derivatives of the dependent variable LCO with respect 
\ . to the independent variables LWD, LVC, and LVL) 18 will take into 
consideration only the estimates of the coefficients that are 
statistically significant. Beginning with the wage differential, 
18 By using the partial derivatives and not the total 
der i vatives as the def inition of elasticity implies, we are 
as,surning that LWD, LVC and LVL independent var iables or exogenous 
to each other. 
f'  
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elasticity of labor supply to the coca sector is represented by 
equation (7): 
€wd = 2.00 + 0.43 (LWD) - 0.77 (LVC) (7) 
The translog specification shows that the constant term of 
the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the wage 
differential is 2.00, and the value for the coefficient of (LWD)2 
is 0.43. This means that the function that relates LWD to LCO 
is not only increasing but also convex, such that the higher the 
level of the wage differential, the higher the increase in labor 
supply. In other words, the elasticity of LCO with respect to 
LWD will be higher at higher levels of LWD. This means that 
labor migration to the coca region will not only increase, but 
increase at higher rates the higher the wage differential, or 
that an increase in wage differentials will increase the value 
of the elasticity of labor supply with respect to wage 
differentials. 
The coeff icient of LVC in equation (7) shows that an 
increase in violence in the coca sector will diminish the value 
of the total elasticity. That is, the response of labor supply 
to a change in wage differential will be less by a constant value 
determined by the coefficient of (LWD) (LVC) in equation (6). It 
should be noted that the greater effect at higher levels of the 
wage differential means that the intercept (in an LCO LWD space) 
has not changed, but that the rate at which labor supply grows 
due to the wage differential has been reduced as violence 
increases. 
The value for the elasticity of labor supply allocation to 
the coca sector with respect to the risk variable LVC (political 
violence) in the coca region is given by (8): 
€w = -1.02 + 0.17 (LVC) - 0.77 (LWD) ( 8) 
r 
I 
The estimate for the coefficient of the logarithm of 
violence in the coca being equal to one, implies a negative unit 
elastic term of the elasticity of labor supply with respect to 
). 
l. 
( 
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violence in the coca region. This means that as violence in the 
coca region increases, labor supply will decrease at the same 
rate. Also, the value for the coeff icient of (LVC) 2 of 0.17, 
shows that as the level of violence increases, the absolute value 
of this elasticity decreases. In other words, the effect of 
additional violence as a deterrent to additional migration 
becomes less and less important as the level of absolute violence 
increases. The negative value of the elasticity of labor supply 
to the coca region with respect to violence in the coca region 
becomes smaller, in absolute terms. This result could be 
explained in psychological terms by the idea that some reported 
violence is frightening, but more reports of violence are merely 
numbing. 
The negative coefficient of -0.77 for the LWD variable in 
equation (8) shows that an increase in the wage differential 
decreases the absolute value of the effect of coca sector 
violence on labor migration to that sector. For a given level 
of violence in the coca region, greater wage differentials 
decrease the elasticity of labor migration. Although this result 
seems counter-intuitive, a possible explanation is that at 
increasing levels of wage differentials (when workers become 
richer) the perception of risk attached to violence in the coca 
region is more significant, and that the negative response to 
violence in the coca sector becomes larger. 
Finally, the elasticity measure of the effect of the level 
of violence in the urban region on the allocation of labor to the 
coca sector is given by (9): 
€ vi = 0 . 68 - o. 08 ( LVL) ( 9 ) 
As expected, the effect of violence in the urban sector 
(Lima) on the migration of labor to the coca region is positive. 
The value of the constant term of the elasticity estimated is 
0.68, and the coefficient for (LVL)2 is -0.08. This means that 
the effect of Lima political violence on the labor migration to 
the coca fields decreases at higher levels of violence . 
_----_._._---------------------_.--------------------.  
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The translog specification gives us more information in 
terms of the reduced form of the original model. The log linear 
specification was too restrictive by not considering change in 
the estimates as the variables of the model changed. In fact, 
a test of null coefficients seems to support the translog model 
as compared to the log linear model. 19 
5.4. Stationarity of the series 
In order to determine if it is better to use a time trend 
or take the nth differences of the variables in the regression, 
we must look at the stationarity of these series. If the series 
are shown to be stationary, and if we run a regression in levels 
(that is the variables taken as they are) the estimators will 
still be valid from the point of view of the inference procedures 
used in regression. If the series are non stationary, the 
variables must be differenced to obtain unbiased estimators. 
A variable in a time series is defined as weakly stationary 
if it has finite mean, variance and covariances, and all of them 
are independent of time. More rigorously, a disturbance term El 
in a regression is said to be a stationary stochastic process if, 
for any value of t, El has a zero mean, a constant variance, and 
is uncorrelated with any other variable in the sequence. 20 
Stationarity is important because it is the basic assumption 
for the standard inference procedures of regression models. If 
a series is non-stationary it invalidates many standard results 
of the regression. A non-stationary series is reflected in the 
presence of a unit root, and if a series must be differenced d 
19 The Chi square value, testing the null hypothesis of 
significance the added variables on the translog specification 
of the second column of table 9 as compared to the log linear 
model of the second column of table 6, is 25.58. Thus the 
probability of not rejecting the null hypothesis of the added 
coefficients being equal to zero, is almost equal to zero. That 
is, the new translog specification seems to be an improvement 
over the log linear one. 
20 See Harvey (1991), pp. 23-30. 
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times to make it stationary, it is called integrated of order d. 
The test for stationarity of a series is the unit root test. 
In this analysis, we use the simple model of equation (3) 
to test for stationarity. In table 10 the variables of the 
equation (3) are tested for unit roots. 
TABLE 10 
From the results obtained in table 10 we can establish that 
most series fail to reject the hypothesis of presence of unit 
roots. 2\ According to this test, if the regression uses levels 
and not first differences, the estimators will still be valid 
according to the statistical procedures used in the regression. 
But in order to see if it is still possible to use the variables 
at their levels as opposed to using their first differences we 
must test to see if these variables are cointegrated. 
If series are non-stationary and integrated of order one, 
their linear combination will also be integrated of order one. 
Therefore, if the variable represented by the residuals (a linear 
combination of the series that are regressed) of the regression 
of these variables has a unit root its variance will explode. 
But if the regression between any variables is to make any sense, 
the residuals of the regression cannot be a linear combination 
of the series regressed, that is, they must reject the presence 
of unit roots (and be stationary). If the residuals are 
stationary, the variables are said to be cointegrated. In 
general, the variables are co integrated if each one individually 
is non stationary (has unit roots) but a linear combination of 
the variables (that is the residual of the regression among the 
variables) is stationary. 
2\ We have also tested for unit roots of the first 
differences of the levels of the variables, we rejected the 
presence of unit roots, therefore establishing that the original 
series were integrated of order one. 
---------------------------------------,-----------, 
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In table 11 we test for cointegration of the variables of 
equation (3). The left hand side series (LCO) is regressed on the 
remaining series (LWD, LVC, LVL, ALAN), a constant, and a trend 
variable. 
TABLE 11 
The results of the co integration tests show that the series 
are cointegrated. The regression analysis done in levels is 
therefore validated, and the properties of the estimators found 
are valid. 
5.5. Stability of the Results 
Another problem found in time series is the sensitivity of 
the parameters to changes in the time structure of the series. 
That is, we want to know if the parameters are constant through 
time. Again, by using the regression based on equation (3), we 
will test for the stability of the results by dropping the last 
four, eight and twelve quarters. 
The results of this exercise are presented in tables 12 and 
r 13. Table 12 includes the dummy variable for the two years ofl" 
the heterodox experience, and table 13 does not. The year listed 
at the top of each column (i.e. 1988) is the last year included 
in the regression. 
TABLES 12 AND 13 
The results of these stability tests are in favor of the 
regression postulated. Looking at table 12 in which a more 
complete specification is presented, the three variables LWD, LVC 
an~ LVL not only maintain the same sign and are statistically 
28 
significant in the four cases tested, but have relatively stable 
parameters. The only exception to this case is the regression 
ending in 1988, in which LWD and LVC lose significance and all 
the parameters are smaller. It is interesting to note that the 
results (both in the size of the parameters and the statistical 
significance) of the "complete" regression ending in 1990 are 
r- very similar to those of the regression ending in 1987. 
The results presented in table 13 show that the main 
conclusions are still valid. The value of the parameters does 
not change significantly with the length of the time period 
chosen, although the problem of the regression ending with 1988 
persists, and the size and statistical significance of LVC seems 
to decrease as the length of the time period decreases. 
Given the problem of low degrees of freedom as the time 
period decreases, we can say that the results are relatively 
stable through time. 
6. Conclusions 
The growth of the coca economy, as seen by the increase in 
illegal coca exports, the number of migrants to the Upper 
Huallaga Valley, and the persistence of relatively high wages in 
the midst of an stagnant economy, has been one of the most 
significant economic phenomena of the Peruvian economy during the 
last decade~ 
A portfolio model applied to the migration decision process 
of a peasant family suggests that not only the expected utility 
maximizing individuals of a family unit would migrate according 
to expected earnings considerations, but also that as instability 
in the urban sector increases, an increase in the migration flow 
to the coca sector would result. At the same time, an increase 
in the risk attached to the coca sector would negatively affect 
migration to that sector. 
using different variables and specifications, in order to 
see their relative explanatory power, the empirical testing of 
migration to the coca sector produced suggestive results. 
29 
The empirical estimation of a log-linear specification shows 
[; that earning differentials are important in affecting the amount 
of labor allocated to the coca sector. Political violence in the 
urban sector also has a positive effect in the growth of labor 
on the coca fields, while violence in the coca region has a 
negative effect. Unemployment in the urban sector shows an 
inconclusive effect on migration to the coca sector. The 
variables used, although they seem to have non-stationary 
properties, are cointegrated and therefore validate standard 
inference procedures. A simple test of stability of the 
parameters shows that they do not change significantly through 
time. 
With a more general (translog) specification, it is not only 
shown that the wage differentials between the coca and urban 
sectors have a positive effect on labor migration to the coca 
sector, but it is also shown that the higher the level of wage 
differential, the higher the response of migration to changes in 
wage differentials. In relation to the risk variables, it is 
shown that: on the one hand, the effect of violence in the coca 
sector as a deterrent to migration is negative, but becomes less 
important as the level of violence increases; on the other hand, 
the level of violence in the urban sector has a positive effect 
on migration to the coca sector, but this effect decreases when 
the level of violence in the urban sector increases. 
l_: 
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TABLE 1 
ESTIMATION OF EQUATION ( 2 ) 
OLS OLS (S . Adj . ) GLS GLS ( S . Adj.) 
[ Constant 
LWO 
10.22 
(67.81) 
0.66 
(8.03) 
10.07 
(63.84) 
0.64 
(8.03) 
10.38 
(78.08) 
0.58 
(8.92) 
10.24 
(85.52) 
0.57 
(9.75) 
1-' 
LVL 
LUN 
0.24 
(6.19) 
3.07 
(7.16) 
0.26 
(6.74) 
3.09 
(7.47) 
0.19 
(5.30) 
3.56 
(9.63) 
0.20 
(6.56) 
3.87 
(11.85) 
[--
01 
02 
0.17 
(2.07) 
0.12 
(1.51) 
0.17 
(2.81) 
0.13 
(2.23) 
[J 
03 
MA( 1) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.45 
(2.66) 
0.03 
(0.43) 
0.68 
(3.93) 
MA( 2) 0.28 
(1.76) 
0.73 
(3.73) 
[' MA(3) 
MA(4) 
0.44 
(2.73) 
0.44 
(2.96) 
0.47 
(2.32) 
0.11 
(0.62) 
[ 
Adj. R2 
O. W. Stat. 
B-P Q Stat. 
N = 44 
t values are 
0.94 0.95 
1. 02 0.86 
47.73 66.29 
in parenthesis 
0.96 
1. 75 
9.47 
0.97 
1. 89 
8.76 
[ 
[ 
[ 
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TABLE 3 
[~ THIRD ESTIMATION OF EQUATION ( 2 ) 
2SLS 2SLS (S . Adj. ) 2SLS 2SLS (S . Adj.) 
(GLS) (GLS) 
r~ Constant 9.93 9.79 10.41 10.23 
L_ (26.81) (24.18) (47.40) (60.32) 
LWD 0.88 0.88 0.65 0.61 
(3.68 ) (3.46) (5.54) (5.78) 
LVL 0.43 0.47 0.22 0.23 
fJ 
LUN 
(2.54) 
-1.24 
(2.62) 
-1.79 
(2.22) 
2.36 
(2.91) 
2.80 
(-0.34) (-0.47) (1.19) (1. 69) 
D1 0.12 0.15 
[ D2 
(0.65) 
0.05 
(2.27) 
(0.12) 
(0.25) (1.65) 
D3 -0.09 0.02 
(-0.47) (0.21) 
[ MA (1) 0.40 (2.17) 0.58 (2.81) 
MA(2) 0.16 0.60 
(0.87) (2.50) 
MA(3 ) 0.36 0.37 
l_ (2.04 ) (1.53) 
MA (4) 0.44 0.10 
(2.80) (0.48) 
Adj. R2 0.78 0.72 0.96 0.96 
nL_.....' 
D. W. Stat 
B-P Q Stat 
N = 44 
0.76 
31. 15 
0.67 
36.11 
1. 73 
5.08 
1. 87 
4.78 
t values are in parenthesis 
[ 
[ 
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TABLE 4 
ESTIMATION OF EQUATION ( 2 ) 
2SLS 2SLS (S. Adj.) 2SLS 
(GLS) 
2SLS (S. Adj.) 
(GLS) 
f' 
L_' 
Constant 9.45 
(17.42) 
9.47 
(22.04) 
10.03 
(70.37) 
10.11 
(71.32) 
LWD -0.18 
(-0.38) 
-0.18 
(-0.43) 
0.25 
(2.00) 
0.38 
(2.82) 
[ LVL 
LUN 
-0.08 
(-0.43) 
-9.61 
(-1.21) 
-0.09 
(-0.49) 
-9.49 
(-1.38) 
0.06 
(1.27) 
-1.28 
(-0.61) 
0.12 
(2.20) 
2.38 
(1.06) 
r~l,: 
TREND 
D1 
0.13 
(1.72) 
0.13 
(1.96) 
-0.48 
(0.23) 
0.05 
(2.71) 
0.02 
(1.05) 
O. 14 
(2.45) 
D2 0.08 
(0.54) 
0.13 
(2.92) 
C: D3 0.05 
(0.36) 
0.04 
(0.97) 
MA (1) 0.86 
(54.03) 
0.83 
(5.42) 
[~ MA (2) 0.80 (5.00) 
MA (3) 0.49 
(2.96) 
[' 
[,-
MA( 4) 
Adj. R2 
D. W. Stat 
B-P Q Stat 
N = 44 
t values are 
0.83 0.83 
0.41 0.37 
104.72 110.54 
in parenthesis 
0.52 
(36.19) 
0.99 
1. 63 
24.75 
0.14 
(1.05) 
0.98 
1. 77 
8.73 
r~ 
t_~ 
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TABLE 5 
[~ FIRST ESTIMATION OF EQUATION ( 3 ) 
OLS OLS (S. Adj. ) GLS GLS (S . Adj . ) 
Constant 10.01 9.92 10.29 10.18[ (54.12) (48.17) (57.09) (51.44) 
LWD 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.50 
(3.50) (3.41) (3.76) (3.96) 
LVC 0.26 0.25 0.16 0.16 [ (4.29) (4.04) (2.75) (2.72) 
LVL 0.23 0.25 0.21 0.23 
(4.16) (4.28) (4.04) (4.27) 
01 0.09 0.09 
(0.86) (0.87) 
[~ 
02 0.08 0.09 
(0.76) (0.93) 
03 -0.03 -0.02 
(-0.33) (-0.22) 
[" MA (1) 0.50 0.50 (2.61) (2.46) 
MA (2) 0.46 0.62 
(2.47) (3.13) 
MA (3) 0.43 0.47[ (2.32) (2.37) 
MA (4) 0.22 0.13 
(1. 13) (0.64) 
C 
Adj. R2 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.91 
D. W. Stat 1. 41 1. 38 1.91 1. 91 
B-P Q Stat 24.29 25.19 11.65 9.31 
N = 44 
t values are in parenthesis 
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TABLE 6 
SECOND ESTIMATION OF EQUATION ( 3 ) 
OLS OLS (S. Adj.) GLS GLS (S. Adj.) 
Constant 10.04 9.93 10.14 10.02 
(104.03) (100.00) (139.57) (128.62)[~ 
LWD 0.40 0.40 0.36 0.31 
(5.92) (6.24) (7.40) (6.65) 
LVC -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 
(-1.24) (-1.54) (-1.73) (-1.92)[~ 
LVL 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.10 
(4.02) (4.59) (3.42) (4.34) 
TREND 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 
(10.40) (11.10) (14.44) (15.33) 
[ D1 0.12 0.10 
(2.33) (2.65) 
D2 0.12 0.09 
(2.38) (2.14) 
[- D3 0.04 0.01 
(0.69) (0.31) 
MA (1) 0.85 0.96 
(5.11) (4.81) 
MA (2) -0.01 0.68 
(-0.04) (2.70)[-_: 
MA (3) 0.09 0.31 
(0.70) (1.61) 
MA(4) 0.53 0.09 
r-- (3.51) (0.65 )
U Adj. R2 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 
D. W. stat 0.93 0.71 1. 80 1. 99 
B-P Q stat 51. 99 66.12 18.13 13.53 
N = 44 
t values are in parenthesis 
[. 
[ 
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TABLE 7 
RATES OF GROWTH OF THE PERUVIAN 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (1980 - 1990) 
SOURCE: Webb and Fernandez Baca (1991), p. 362 
"-----------------
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TABLE 8 
[.i THIRD ESTIMATION OF EQUATION ( 3 ) 
OLS OLS (S. Adj . ) GLS GLS ( S . Adj . ) 
Lj Constant 10.06 (141.68) 9.96 (147.66) 10.08 (154.12) 10.01 (141.66) 
LWD 0.35 
(6.92) 
0.35 
(7.92) 
0.35 
(7.74) 
0.36 
(7.26) 
[' LVC 
LVL 
-0.05 
(-1.53) 
0.09 
(4.03) 
-0.06 
(-2.05) 
0.10 
(5.03) 
-0.05 
(-1.59) 
0.10 
(4.72) 
-0.06 
(-2.33) 
0.08 
(3.93) 
[.-
TIME 
ALAN 
0.05 
(14.58) 
0.23 
(5.85) 
0.05 
(16.89) 
0.22 
(6.59) 
0.04 
(15.22) 
0.20 
(6.02) 
0.05 
(18.22) 
0.24 
(6.02) 
[J 
D1 
D2 
0.11 
(3.10) 
0.12 
(3.49) 
0.12 
(3.76) 
0.14 
(4.31) 
D3 0.04 
(1.23) 
0.05 
(1. 62) 
[~ MA( 1) 0.03 (0.22) 0.38 (1.99) 
MA (2) -0.32 
(-3.08) 
0.27 
(1.39) 
1_-
MA(3 ) 
MA(4) 
0.35 
(3.43) 
0.73 
(6.75) 
-0.25 
(-1.49) 
-0.56 
(-3.46) 
t_ 
Adj. R2 
D. W. stat 
B-P Q stat 
N = 44 
t values are 
0.99 0.99 
1. 65 1. 45 
26.75 13.19 
in parenthesis 
0.99 
1. 84 
9.90 
0.99 
1. 86 
7.15 
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TABLE 9 
ESTIMATION OF EQUATION (5) 
OLS OLS (S. Adj.) GLS 
Constant 10.89 10.96 10.75 
(14.06) (13.69) (17.01) 
LWD 1. 99 2.38 2.00 
(1.51) (1.72) (1.83) 
LVC -0.99 -1.12 -1. 02 
(-1.79) (-1.99) (-2.18) 
LVL 0.36 0.37 0.68 
(1.32) (1.30) (2.86) 
0.32 0.42 0.43 
(0.94) (1.20) (1.53) 
0.09 0.08 0.17 
(0.85) (0.74) (1.90) 
(LVL) 2 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 
(-0.70) (-0.83) (-1.51) 
(LWD) (LVC) -0.42 -0.43 -0.77 
(-1.76) (-1.78) (-3.74) 
(LWD) (LVL) -0.08 -0.16 0.13 
(-0.23) (-0.45) (0.47) 
(LVL) (LVC) 0.17 0.21 0.08 
(0.82) (1.00) (0.50) 
D1 0.13 
(1.28) 
D2 0.09 
(0.83) 
D3 -0.01 
(-0.18) 
MA (1) 0.76 
(4.55) 
MA(2 ) 0.47 
(2.89) 
Adj. R2 0.92 0.92 0.95 
D. W. Stat 1. 25 1. 22 2.00 
B-P Q Stat 29.57 32.51 7.49 
N = 44 
t values are in parenthesis 
GLS (S. Adj.) 
10.53 
(15.55) 
1. 76 
(1.49) 
-1. 00 
(-2.08) 
0.61 
(2.46) 
0.41 
(1.36) 
0.14 
(1.48) 
-0.07 
(-1.22) 
-0.65 
(-3.07) 
0.12 
(0.39) 
0.12 
(0.66) 
0.13 
(1.55) 
0.09 
(1.03) 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
0.47 
(2.66) 
0.47 
(2.77) 
0.94 
1. 87 
6.97 
[I 
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TABLE 10 
TESTING FOR UNIT ROOTS 
x ADF(O) ADF(l) ADF(2) ADF(3) ADF(4) 
LCO -0.42 -0.56 2.27 1.11 -0.63 
LWD -0.30 -0.19 -0.37 -0.78 -0.29 
LVC -5.03 -3.14 -3.09 -2.81 -2.65 
[' LVL -5.12 -4.49 -2.85 -2.14 -1.81 
R(LCO-A) -2.49 -2.60 -2.37 -2.61 -2.91 
[i 
Note: ADF(q), the augmented Dickey-Fuller test, is the t-
statistic of the estimated value of p in the regression: 
q 
~Xl = CONSTANT + TREND + pX t_1 + L Xl_; 
i=l 
R(LCO-A) are the residuals of the regression of LCO in the 
variable ALAN. 
The critical values by MacKinnon are -3.52 for the 5% level 
and -3.19 for the 10% level. 
40 
TABLE 11 
ENGLE-GRANGER TEST FOR COINTEGRATION 
ADF(O) ADF(1) ADF(2) ADF(3) ADF(4) 
LCO-Xs -5.38 -5.84 -4.03 -3.11 -2.72 
Note: LCO-Xs is the regression in which the test for 
co integration has been applied. The variables tested for 
co integration are LCO, LWD, LVC, LVL and ALAN. 
The critical values by MacKinnon are -5.14 for the 5% level 
and -4.76 for the 10% level. 
L: 
41 
i" 
TABLE 12 
[: FIRST STABILITY TEST OF THE REGRESSION OF EQUATION ( 3 ) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 
[" Constant 10.16 (57.00) 9.75 (171.54) 9.88 (159.17) 10.01 (141.66) 
LWD 0.50 
(4.43) 
0.05 
(0.82) 
0.22 
(3.99) 
0.36 
(7.26) 
[. 
LVC 
LVL 
-0.06 
(-2.08) 
0.08 
(2.72) 
-0.02 
(-1.28) 
0.04 
(2.85) 
-0.05 
(-1.93) 
0.08 
(3.97) 
-0.06 
(-2.33) 
0.08 
(3.93) 
[' 
l. 
TIME 
ALAN 
0.04 
(5.69) 
0.22 
(4.10) 
0.06 
(18.66) 
0.11 
(4.54) 
0.05 
(17.49) 
0.18 
(6.42) 
0.05 
(18.22) 
0.24 
(6.02) 
01 0.11 
(2.00) 
0.11 
(5.27) 
0.11 
(3.77) 
0.12 
(3.76) 
[" 02 0.16 (4.69) 0.16 (8.14) 0.15 (5.12 ) 0.14 (4.31) 
03 0.05 
(0.90) 
0.07 
(3.58) 
0.07 
(2.26) 
0.05 
(1.62) 
[,~ MA (1) 0.46 (2.44) 0.85 (3.80) 0.52 (2.40) 0.38 (1.99) 
MA( 2) -0.22 
(-0.87) 
0.65 
(2.23) 
0.34 
(1.44) 
0.27 
(1.39) 
r 'I 
L,; 
MA( 3) 
MA( 4) 
-0.50 
(-1.84) 
-0.62 
(-2.84) 
0.26 
(0.92) 
-0.03 
(-0.11) 
0.24 
(0.99) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
-0.25 
(-1.49) 
-0.56 
(-3.46) 
[:
L __ 
Adj. R2 
D. W. Stat 
B-P Q Stat 
0.99 
1. 91 
7.84 
N=32 
0.99 
1. 97 
6.26 
N=36 
0.99 
1. 97 
6.64 
N=40 
0.99 
1. 86 
7.15 
N=44 
t values are in parenthesis 
r 
L.c 
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TABLE 13 
r·' SECOND STABILITY TEST OF THE REGRESSION OF EQUATION ( 3 ) 
---_: 
1987 1988 1989 1990 
Constant 9.93 9.79 9.86 10.02 
(164.23) (138.77) (173.50) (128.62)[~J 
LWD 0.30 0.08 0.19 0.31 
(4.45) (1.00) (3; 88) (6.65) 
LVC -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 
C' (-1.28) (-0.91) (-2.22) (-1.92) 
L: 
LVL 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.10 
(3. 12) (3.06) (4.83) (4.34) 
TIME 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 
(16.74) (15.13) (21.31) (15.33) 
[~ 
D1 0.12 0.10 0.11 0.10 
(5.02) (3.02) (3.89) (2.65) 
D2 0.17 0.11 0.15 0.09 
(6.74) (3.42) (5.61) (2.14) 
D3 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.01[~ 
(2.66) (1.08) (2.66) (0.31) 
MA( 1) 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.96 
(4.21) (3.78) (7.47) (4.81) 
MA (2) 0.85 0.80 0.77 0.68 
(4.09) (2.57) (10.75) (2.70)[-, 
MA (3) 0.48 0.19 0.97 0.31 
(2.54 ) (0.62 ) (14.94) (1.61) 
MA( 4) 0.13 0.06 0.77 0.08 
(0.88) (0.31) (6.74) (0.65)[- -. 
Adj. R2 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 
D. W. Stat 1. 79 1. 78 1. 83 1.99 
B-P Q Stat 6.12 18.22 17.09 13.53 
N=32 N=36 N=40 N=44 
( 
L. t values are in parenthesis 
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APPENDIX 1 
SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY OF THE DATA USED 
The data used in the estimation of the models reported in 
section 6 of this paper is presented in Appendix 2. What follows 
is a description of the sources and of how the data was 
obtained: 
1) Labor in the coca sector. 
The total labor used in coca and coca paste production for 
the Upper Huallaga Valley has been calculated by using the [ estimates of total land utilized for the production of coca in 
the valley. This annual data has been taken from Briceno and 
Martinez (1989) for the years 1980 to 1987. For these years we 
use the numbers reported by the authors, and originally from the 
Ministry of Agriculture and other official agencies, as estimates 
of the total size of the land where coca is cultivated in the 
Upper Huallaga Valley. To calculate the rate of growth in the 
year 1980, we have used the estimate of coca production for 1979 
as reported by Maletta (1985) for the Department of Huanuco, who 
also uses official sources as estimates. To estimate the land 
of coca cultivated for 1988 to 1990 we have used the rate of 
growth of the agricultural coca value added as presented by Webb 
and Fernandez-Baca (1991). 
After obtaining an annual series for land cultivated with 
L: coca in the Upper Huallaga Valley, the numbers obtained are the 
total land cultivated at the end of the year. We obtain 
estimates of quarterly labor use with the following assumptions: 
The agricultural labor will have both a seasonal and a non-
seasonal component. The non-seasonal component is identified as 
the harvest, given that it is done an average of four to six 
times a year, while the non-seasonal component is the seeding and 
cultivation of the land. The industrial labor has only a non 
[ 
[' 
l~ 
I 
IL __ 
L: 
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seasonal component. According to Tantahuilca (1989), the non-
seasonal coefficient of labor use for the agricultural sector is 
equivalent to 0.833 laborers per year per hectare, or 250 
required work days out of 300. The industrial labor coefficient 
has been taken from Alvarez (1991) who estimates an average of 
0.5 units of industrial (i.e. coca paste) labor for every unit 
of agricultural labor in the coca fields. Furthermore, we assume 
that both the industrial and the non-seasonal agricultural labor 
use grows at a constant rate during the year. The seasonal 
aspect of the agricultural labor use, on the other hand, follows 
a seasonal pattern, where we have taken the quarterly estimates 
of labor use for coca reported by Maletta (1985). The seasonal 
component is obtained by mUltiplying the number of hectares added 
in a particular year times the seasonality index for the quarter 
times 0.66 (or 198 labor days out of 300 working days). Taking 
the sum of these three components we obtain a rough estimate of 
the labor used in coca production for each quarter from 1980 
until 1990. 
2) Wages in the coca sector. 
The wage figure for the coca sector is the one reported for 
agricultural work in the coca fields of the Upper Huallaga Valley 
in different studies and reports. We have used an estimate of 
the wages in the coca region by taking different measures for 
peasant wages in different sources, such as Andean Report (1985-
1990), Bedoya and Verdera (1987), Peru-CORAH (1991), Instituto 
Libertad y Democracia (1991), Laity (1989), Morales (1986) and 
(1989), Peru Econ6mico (1989), Peru Report (1989), and 
Tantahuilca (1989). We have taken the wage reported (most times 
in current U.S. dollars) and converted them into thousands of 
soles at 1979 prices, at the black market exchange rate. For the 
quarters in which there is no information available, we have 
assumed a constant rate of growth in dollar wages. 
51 
3) Wages in the urban sector. 
The variable that measures the earnings in an alternative 
(urban) sector will be the minimum wage, which, given the 
existence of unemployment is binding for any worker that can find 
a job; it is also a good measure of the wage for unskilled labor 
in Peru. The source is the monthly data pUblished in Peru 
(1991), as the "Compendio Estadistico 1990-91", Vol. 1, p. 460, 
and the series is in constant prices of 1979, adjusted by the 
Lima consumer price index obtained from the same source, Vol. 2, 
p. 351, 355. To obtain quarterly data, we have averaged the 
monthly data over three months. 
4) Unemployment. 
The first variable to be used as a measure of risk in the 
urban sector is unemployment. There are no monthly or quarterly 
statistics on unemployment for Peru or Lima, but there are 
monthly indexes of total employment in some sectors. The 
employment index that we use is the one for permanent employment 
in the Lima petty trade sector. This is consistently reported 
by the National Institute of statistics from a survey of small 
firms, but since this is an index of employment, we have used the 
inverse of the index of employment for the "petty traders" in 
Lima as a proxy for unemployment in that sector. The source is 
the "Compendio Estadistico 1990-91 11 in Peru (1991), Vol 1, p. 
423. 
[ 
5) Political violence. 
We have taken the number of violent acts as reported by 
Desco (1990) for the Province of Lima, and for the Provinces of 
the Departments of San Martin and Huanuco, for the years 1980 to 
1988. These include mostly politically motivated violent acts, 
but in the Departments of San Martin and Huanuco. The 
I 
distinction between political and organized cr ime violence is not 
always clear, and we assume that they are equivalent. For the 
years 1989 and 1990 we have used the Resumen Semanal, (several 
issues) • 
l·. 
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6) Industrial Output. 
The index of industrial production used as an instrumental 
variable for unemployment in the urban sector is the three month 
average of the monthly the index of physical volume of output 
taken from "Compendio Estadlstico 1990-91" in Peru (1991), Vol. 
2, p. 141. [ 
r-
[ 
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DATE LABOR wgeo WgLi vie VLi EMPLO INDUS 
[ 
[ 861 113621 1.19 0.27 16 99 93.4 96.5 
862 132140 1.14 0.26 6 128 92.4 111. 8 
863 130750 1.10 0.23 8 139 92.4 117.3 
864 128474 1.16 0.27 5 70 91.8 130.9 
871 143557 1.14 0.23 10 94 90.7 119.5 
872 158832 1. 56 0.30 16 74 89.2 126.1 
873 157601 1. 70 0.30 24 73 88.0 134.8 
874 155399 1. 95 0.29 22 70 87.4 139.1 
881 164608 1. 69 0.26 17 44 88.7 128.1 
[~ 
[, 
882 174848 2.19 0.24 29 93 91.4 122.7 
883 173979 2.14 0.26 16 72 89.9 111.8 
884 172350 2.30 0.19 31 93 88.5 90.7 
891 171675 1. 72 0.13 21 79 87.4 85.3 
892 173714 1. 28 0.11 25 94 83.8 86.0 
893 173532 0.99 0.12 23 89 79.4 91.6 
894 173175 1. 19 0.11 32 126 78.1 105.0 
901 174122 0.86 0.11 29 115 78.3 103.0 
902 175278 1.14 0.11 36 142 77.7 91.8 
[; 903 175174 1. 07 0.10 31 126 75.5 71.3 
904 174970 0.65 0.10 27 105 72.0 85.2 
Sources: See Appendix 1. 
[-. I , ' 
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